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Concern that mitigation efforts might decrease once SAI was discussed as an option in the fight against climate change is strong both in scientific debate (Lawrence & Crutzen 2013; Schneider 2001 ) and among lay persons (Corner & Pidgeon 2014; Ipsos MORI 2010; Mercer et al 2011; Merk et al 2015; Wibeck et al. 2015; Winickoff et al. 2015) . In scientific debate, this concern is referred to as "risk compensation", "moral hazard" or "mitigation obstruction" (Betz & Cacean 2012; Keith 2013; Morrow 2014) . Lay persons participating in surveys or focus groups have found the risk compensation argument convincing and fear that SAI might be used as an excuse to continue with carbon-intensive lifestyles (Corner & Pidgeon 2014; Ipsos MORI 2010; Mercer et al 2011; Merk et al 2015; Wibeck et al. 2015; Winickoff et al. 2015) . The validity of this concern is underlined by many theoretical arguments (for an overview see Lin 2012; Morrow 2014) . It is said, for example, that optimism bias and overconfidence can be expected to lead to the perception of SAI as a viable technological fix for climate change, an attitude that creates an illusion of control (Lin 2012) . People also tend to readily accept arguments exonerating them from their responsibility for climate change and wrongly justifying a mitigation cutback (Morrow 2014 ).
Despite the prominence and persuasiveness of the risk-compensation argument, there has as yet been no rigorous assessment of whether people actually reduce mitigation. Prior studies have dealt only indirectly with risk compensation, discussing the perception of CE, of SAI or of the risk-compensation argument. Nonetheless, these studies provide helpful insights into people's perceptions of mitigation and SAI, and a number of them cast doubt on the validity of the riskcompensation argument. Participants in group discussions have stated that mitigation should remain a priority (Bellamy et al. 2015; IAGP 2014; Ipsos MORI 2010) . In a survey study, most respondents were against SAI being used as a way of continuing with carbon-intensive lifestyles (Mercer et al. 2011) . Furthermore, in two focus groups participants were in favour of increasing mitigation efforts once they had learned about SAI (Shepherd 2009; Wibeck et al. 2015) . These findings indicate no decrease in the perceived importance of mitigation as a result of knowledge about SAI and accordingly question the validity of the risk-compensation argument. What it is that actually drives such behaviour has so far remained a matter for speculation.
There are three reasons why knowledge of SAI might not lead to risk compensation and might indeed even cause an increase in mitigation. First, risk compensation can only occur if its basic assumption is not fulfilled, i.e. SAI has to be perceived as an effective method against climate change (Corner & Pidgeon 2014; Hedlund 2000; Lin 2012 ). This assumption has not yet been tested empirically. Second, information on SAI might function as a clarion call; when they learn that such massive interventions as SAI are under consideration, people might take the threat of climate change more seriously and thus mitigate more (Reynolds 2015) . One survey experiment found that subjects who were informed about CE were slightly more concerned about climate change than subjects in the control group (Kahan et al. 2015) . Third, an increase in mitigation could also be caused by the perception of SAI as a threat. Research on acceptance shows that individuals respond very negatively to the idea of SAI and support for it is low (Borick & Rabe 2012; Macnaghten & Szerszynski 2013; Merk et al. 2015; Wright et al. 2014) . As a policy option against climate change, mitigation is preferred over CE (Pidgeon et al. 2012; US GAO 2011; Wibeck et al. 2015) . Accordingly, people may mitigate more, so as to prevent the deployment of SAI.
This study undertakes an empirical evaluation of the risk-compensation argument. It is the first to test whether information about SAI actually changes people's behaviour and if so, in which direction. We then analyse the drivers of the observed behavioural changes more closely. The mitigation behaviour we observe in the study is the purchase of voluntary carbon offsets (VCO) (Löschel et al. 2013; Diederich & Goeschl 2014) ; this means that we do not merely rely on statements of intent but evaluate actual decisions.
We recruited our subjects from a German online panel and randomly assigned them to one of three treatments. The control group (BASE) received information on climate change only, while the treatment group (SAI) received information on both climate change and SAI. The augmented information group (AUG) received additional information on climate change; the text in AUG is the same length as the text in SAI. After having read the information, all 658 subjects could spend any integer amount on VCOs using an endowment of €10. Any remaining endowment was credited to the subjects' account with the online panel (see Methods section for details).
A first look at the summary statistics reveals no significant difference in average VCO purchases between treatments (Wilcoxon rank-sum tests, p>0.105). On average, subjects buy 4 offsets in the BASE treatment (95% confidence interval (CI) [3.51, 4 .49]), 4.59 offsets in the SAI treatment (95% CI [4.06, 5.13]), and 4.22 offsets in the AUG treatment (95% CI [3.70, 4.74] ).
To control for the influence of other factors on the mitigation decision, we run a Tobit regression (Table 1) . When we include the controls, we find that learning about the SAI option increases offset purchases significantly (p=0.011). By contrast, merely reading a longer text on the effects of climate change in the AUG treatment does not influence offset purchases over and against the BASE treatment (p=0.913). Accordingly, it is the information content of the SAI treatment that drives the observed increase in offset purchases and not the additional quantity of general information on climate change (Wald test, p=0.020).
As control variables we include the perception of climate change risks and mitigation, the influence of the study's experimental purchase mechanism, the perceived effectiveness of offsets, and socio-demographic variables. This ensures that these factors do not drive the results or obscure the treatment effect.
The following control variables influence the purchase decisions significantly in the expected way (Table 1) . Subjects who feel morally obliged to help mitigate climate change buy more offsets (p<0.001). Subjects who believe that offsets are an effective way of mitigating climate change also purchase more offsets (p<0.001). Subjects who would rather buy offsets directly purchase fewer of them than those who prefer buying through us (p<0.001). Finally, a high level of education increases VCO purchases (p<0.001).
The treatment effect of SAI information on offset purchases is substantial compared to other factors. On average, subjects buy 0.8 VCOs more when they have been informed about SAI.
Compared to other factors, this effect is similar to an increase in perceived VCO effectiveness of half a standard deviation or to an increase of one standard deviation in the perceived moral obligation to mitigate. (1) factor of the variables perception of climate change impacts `today'/`in 25 years' for people in `my environment including myself'/`in industrialized countries'/`in developing countries' (2) `In your daily life, how often do you try to cut down on greenhouse gas emissions?'; (3) `I feel morally obliged to help mitigate climate change.' (4) Perceived effectiveness of voluntary carbon offsets; Influence on purchase decision of: (5) `The IfW is handling the purchase, not me.' and (6) `My remaining endowment can only be cashed in via the online panel.' For full description of variables, see Appendix Table A-1. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
In the final step of the analysis, we test the potential reasons for the absence of risk compensation and for the observed increase in purchases. To this end, we look at the three potential reasons we identified before and how they interact with the SAI information treatment. This reveals whether subjects in the SAI treatment buy more VCOs generally or only under certain conditions. Since behaviour in BASE and AUG
is not significantly different, we pool the data from these treatments in the following analyses.
First, risk-compensation arguments require that SAI be perceived as an effective measure against climate change risks. Figure 1 plots the effect of the SAI treatment on offset purchases for different levels of perceived SAI effectiveness. As expected, subjects who perceive SAI to be ineffective do not change their mitigation behaviour after learning about SAI compared to those in BASE (p=0.826) . Contrary to what risk-compensation arguments suggest, subjects who think SAI is effective do not reduce their mitigation (p=0.765). An increase in offset purchases is observed for those who think SAI is largely ineffective (p=0.018) or who feel unable to assess SAI's effectiveness (p=0.001).
Figure 1: Effect of SAI treatment depending on perceived effectiveness of SAI Note: Predicted margins from a Tobit regression including the control variables of the regression presented in Table 1 additionally including interaction effects between SAI and perceived effectiveness of SAI (see Appendix Table A However, subjects who are just as alarmed about climate change as they were before learning about SAI also buy significantly more VCOs (AME=0.81, p=0.017). This indicates that though SAI slightly increases awareness of climate change risks, it does not drive the increase in VCO purchases.
Third, the increase in purchases might be caused by the perception of SAI as a threat and thus by a lack of acceptance of the technology. Subjects in the SAI treatment were asked about the acceptability of SAI research in the lab. This item is a strong indicator of acceptance because lab research is still a long way from deployment; not accepting lab research implies strong opposition to SAI. On average, subjects who disagree with the conduct of lab research and those who `don't know' buy more offsets (p=0.082 and p=0.015, respectively) than subjects in the BASE and the AUG treatment (Figure 2) . Interestingly, subjects in the SAI treatment who have no objection to SAI lab research also buy more offsets on average (p=0.015).
Figure 2: Effect of SAI depending on attitude towards SAI research.
Note: Predicted margins from a Tobit regression including the control variables of the regression presented in Table 1 additionally including interaction effects between SAI and the acceptance of SAI research in the lab (see Appendix Table S-4 for full results).
To sum up, we find no evidence for risk compensation at an individual level as a reaction to information on SAI. Furthermore, we find no reduction in mitigation for those who perceive SAI as an effective method against climate change, even though they should be the ones most likely to reduce mitigation. Instead, our results empirically support the intuition that subjects who have been informed about SAI will mitigate more (Shepherd 2009; Betz & Caecan 2012; IASS 2014; Wibeck et al. 2015) .
We examine two potential explanations for an increase in the mitigation levels. We find that though for many subjects information on SAI increases concern about climate change, it does not drive the increase in VCO purchases. Essentially, we find that subjects who perceive the deployment of SAI as an actual threat increase mitigation to prevent a level of climate change that would make the deployment of SAI more likely. This is reflected in the increase in mitigation by individuals who are uncertain about SAI effectiveness, who think it is largely ineffective, who reject SAI research or who are uncertain about SAI research. Correspondingly, those who think that SAI would not be effective do not buy more VCOs because they do not think the deployment of SAI is at all likely. Future research should examine this argument more closely.
In addition, subjects who agree with SAI research increase mitigation as well, even though they do not reject the idea out of hand. This is in line with previous findings: On the one hand, the acceptance of SAI research does not automatically imply the acceptance of deployment (Pidgeon et al. 2013) . SAI is perceived ambiguously as an emergency measure whose deployment should be prevented (Merk et al. 2015) . People may thus increase mitigation because the deployment of SAI could be prevented if mitigation levels were higher. On the other hand, people think that just one method alone will not be enough to solve climate change and any progress on CE should be conditional on reaching mitigation targets (Ipsos MORI 2010; Winickoff et al. 2015) .
Our findings suggest that research on SAI and public engagement with it is not likely to undermine current mitigation efforts by individuals. Our results, however, depend on the information we provided our subjects with and people may react differently to other framings. In addition, this does not affect the argument that other actors like policymakers or interest groups might reduce mitigation efforts because of SAI. This should be addressed by future research.
Methods

Sample
The experiment was administered online. Recruitment was performed from the German internet population using an online panel. Participants were sampled using quotas for the characteristics gender, age and state (Land) of residence. The final sample consisted of 658 cases. 1,262 subjects completed the experiment. Of these subjects, 19 provided identical answers for at least three blocks of questions and 375 completed the experiments in less than 12 minutes. There is strong evidence that these subjects did not read the information provided. Of the remaining 868 subjects, 210 subjects chose the "don't know" response on at least one of our main explanatory variables and could not be included in the analysis. The number of surveys completed in less time than required to read the material is high. This is probably due to the substantial remuneration, which subjects only received when they had completed the experiment.
The average age of subjects in the final sample was 49 (18 to 86 years). 46 percent of the subjects were female. 51 percent of the subjects had a high level of education, whereas 49 percent of the subjects had completed only lower secondary education or had no school leavers' certificate. The fieldwork was conducted within a period of four weeks in March and April 2015.
Experimental design
The experiment consisted of three treatment groups that subjects were randomly assigned to:
BASE (N=243), SAI (N=211) and AUG (N=204). The treatments contain different blocks of information (see Table M Subjects in BASE received no further information. Subjects in SAI were additionally informed about the injection of aerosols into the stratosphere as a third way of dealing with climate change alongside mitigation and adaptation. The basic principles of SAI were set out along with the risks and benefits involved according to current scientific knowledge (e.g., Crutzen 2006; Rickels et al. 2011; Robock 2008) . Unlike SAI, subjects in AUG were provided with additional information on expected future climate changes (IPCC 2014). The AUG treatment ensures that any differences in behaviour between BASE and SAI will be due to the qualitative effect of the information on SAI and not to changes in the amount of information or in the time spent reading about climate change.
After having received the information, all subjects were told about the possibility of supporting climate mitigation projects by purchasing VCOs (See Appendix for experimental script). Subjects could use their endowment of €10 to purchase offsets, each mitigating 50 kg CO 2 . The offsets were offered at a reduced price of €1, amounting to a subsidy of €0.15 per offset paid by the researchers. The subsidy incentivised subjects to make any planned purchases of offsets during the experiment instead of postponing them until later. This made it possible for us to observe any changes in planned behaviour concerning the purchase of VCOs. Before the purchase, subjects had to correctly answer four questions designed to check whether they had understood the choice situation and its consequences. Subjects who failed to answer the control questions correctly in fewer than four attempts were not allowed to continue with the survey. Any endowment remaining after the purchase was credited to the subjects' accounts with the online panel. After the experiment, subjects were sent a link to a confirmation of purchase for the offsets.
Survey details
The survey and the experiment consisted of four parts: (1) information blocks according to treatment, (2) questions on climate change perception, (3) information on, and purchase of, VCOs, (4) questions on purchasing motives and on perception of the information text, (5) questions on attitudes towards climate change, mitigation and SAI research, (6) sociodemographic questions. The sequence of items within the blocks of questions was randomised to avoid order effects. The variables used in the analysis are listed in the supplementary material.
Principal component analysis was used to combine items assessing the perception of climate change risks into one factor.
Continued
Questions and items response scale
Effect of SAI information on perception of climate change (The idea of sulfate particles being released into higher regions of the atmosphere to counter climate change affects my feelings about climate change. I now find it …) … a lot more threatening; … more threatening; … as threatening or not threatening as before; … less threatening; … no longer threatening. Note: SAI is a dummy variable indicating the SAI treatment. SAI effectiveness is a categorical variable indicating perceived SAI effectiveness (1 = not effective, 2 = largely ineffective, 3 = effective, 4 = don't know). Female and higher education are dummy variables; all others except awareness of climate change impacts are standardised.
Research on SAI
(1) factor of the variables perception of climate change impacts `today'/`in 25' years for people in `my environment including myself'/`in industrialized countries'/`in developing countries' (2) `In your daily life, how often do you try to cut down on greenhouse gas emission?'; (3) `I feel morally obliged to help mitigate climate change.' (4) Perceived effectiveness of voluntary carbon offsets; influence on purchase decision of: (5) `The IfW is handling the purchase, not me.' and (6) `My remaining endowment can only be cashed in via the online panel.' For complete description of variables, see Appendix Table A-1. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Note: Higher CC threat is a categorical variable indicating an alteration in perception of climate change caused by learning about SAI (1 = more threatening, 0 = as threatening or not threatening as before, -1 = less threatening); the variable was only elicited in the SAI treatment and is thus also an indication of the SAI treatment. Female and higher education are dummy variables; all others except awareness of climate change impacts are standardised.
(1) factor of the variables perception of climate change impacts `today'/`in 25 years' for people in `my environment including myself'/`in industrialized countries'/`in developing countries' (2) `In your daily life, how often do you try to cut down on greenhouse gas emission?'; (3) `I feel morally obliged to help mitigate climate change.' (4) Perceived effectiveness of voluntary carbon offsets; influence on purchase decision of: (5) `The IfW is handling the purchase, not me.' and (6) `My remaining endowment can only be cashed in via the online panel.' For complete description of variables, see Appendix TableA-1. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Table A Note: SAI research is a categorical variable indicating agreement with SAI research in the lab or using computer models (1 = disagree, 2 = tend to disagree, 3 = tend to agree, 4 = agree, 5 = don't know); the variable was only elicited in the SAI treatment and is thus also an indication of the SAI treatment Female and higher education are dummy variables; all others except awareness of climate change impacts are standardised.
(1) factor of the variables perception of climate change impacts `today'/`in 25 years' for people in `my environment including myself'/`in industrialized countries'/`in developing countries' (2) `In your daily life, how often do you try to cut down on greenhouse gas emission?'; (3) `I feel morally obliged to help mitigate climate change.' (4) Perceived effectiveness of voluntary carbon offsets; influence on purchase decision of: (5) `The IfW is handling the purchase, not me.' and (6) `My remaining endowment can only be cashed in via the online panel.' For complete description of variables, see Appendix Table A-1. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Information treatment
Please read the following text carefully:
Causes of climate change
Since 1900, the average global surface temperature has risen by about 0.9°C. It is extremely likely that this has been caused by increased emissions of greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide (CO 2 ). Greenhouse gases are, for example, released when coal, oil and gas are burnt. If the current trend continues and nothing is done about climate change, the average global surface temperature will have risen by about another 3.9°C by the end of the century.
Visible evidence of climate change
Changes in climate can already be observed. It has been getting warmer. Massive glacier loss is evident almost everywhere. Arctic sea-ice and the snow cover of the northern hemisphere have also decreased.
The oceans have grown warmer and the sea level has risen. Furthermore, the oceans have absorbed about two-thirds of the greenhouse gases emitted and acidification of the seas is on the rise.
Since about 1950, changes in many extreme weather and climate events have been observed. Among other things, there are fewer very cold days and more very hot days. There has also been an increase in the number of extreme precipitation events in some regions.
All of these changes have an effect on plants, animals and humans. The more greenhouse gases we emit, the bigger the future changes will be.
[new Screen]
To stop or reduce climate change and its effects, various measures can be adopted either individually or in combination with each other. These include:
Climate protection via reduction of greenhouse gas emissions Greenhouse gas emissions can be reduced by switching to renewable energies or by a change in consumer behaviour. Switching to renewable energies (e.g. wind or solar energy) costs money, requires grid expansion and involves interference with landscapes and Nature. Changes in consumer behaviour include flying less frequently, switching from the car to public transport/bikes or lowering room temperatures.
Adaptation to climate change Examples of adaptation to climate change are building higher dikes, resettling people or cultivating more stress-resistant crops. Adaptation measures also involve costs. Resettling means that a lot of people will lose their livelihood and their social environment. Some animals and plants are either completely or largely unable to adapt, especially when environmental changes happen very suddenly.
only for SAI-treatment Manipulation of global surface temperature Currently there is increasing discussion about a measure for manipulating surface temperature directly. When sulfate particles are released into higher regions of the atmosphere, they reflect some of the sunlight back out into space before it warms the Earth.
This measure could slow down global warming much faster than cutting back greenhouse gas emissions. To achieve that goal, the particle layer would have to be renewed constantly until the share of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere dropped again. Ocean acidification cannot be prevented by this measure.
Little research has been done on the effects and side effects of this measure. Injecting sulfate particles could have negative effects on various ecosystems, the ozone layer and the health of animals and people. Furthermore, political conflicts might arise over deployment itself and the extent of deployment. It is unclear whether additional negative effects would occur during deployment. Research can provide new information about effects and side effects, without necessarily coming to any definite conclusions.
only for AUG treatment Future climate development Researchers throughout the world are trying to work out how the climate will change in future.
The following points are largely uncontested:
Global mean surface temperature will continue to rise. Heat waves will occur more frequently. In addition, hot days will become hotter and more frequent, while cold days will be warmer and less frequent. However, occasional extremely cold winters will continue to occur. In many regions, the number of extreme precipitation events will increase, as will the occurrence of longer and more severe droughts. The differences between arid and humid regions will increase. The differences between dry and wet seasons will also increase (with some regional exceptions).
In future, the Arctic sea-ice cover will shrink and lose volume and the spring snow cover in the northern hemisphere will decrease. Glacier volume will continue to decrease and the ocean will get progressively warmer. Extremest ocean warming is projected for subtropical regions in the northern hemisphere and for tropical regions. The sea level will continue to rise, though not uniformly across regions.
Purchasing CO 2 certificates against climate change Another way of cutting down greenhouse gas emissions is to buy CO 2 certificates. The trade revenues finance projects to combat climate change like the construction of renewable energy systems or projects to improve energy efficiency.
In this questionnaire you have the opportunity to contribute to the fight against climate change and to buy CO 2 certificates. To do so, you can use the 10 euros you were given for taking part in this survey. Any money you do not use to buy certificates will be added to your YouGov account approximately 4 weeks after completing the survey.
The certificates meet the so-called gold standard. In other words, you can rest assured that carefully selected and certified projects will be financed by the certificates and that CO 2 reduction is actually happening. Every one of these certificates reduces greenhouse gas emission by 50 kg CO 2 .
How much is 50 kg CO 2 ? A car emits approximately 50 kg CO 2 during a drive from Hamburg to Berlin. Average per capita emission in Germany is 11,400 kg CO 2 every year. On a global scale, average emission per head of population amounts to approximately 5,100 kg CO 2 every year.
How much does one CO 2 certificate cost?
Usually, one certificate costs 1.15 euros. If you buy certificates during this survey, the Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) will shoulder 15 cents of the cost of every certificate. As a participant in this survey you only need to pay 1 euro to mitigate the emission of 50 kg CO 2 .
[new Screen]
How does the purchase work? After completing the survey, the IfW will buy the requested amount of CO 2 certificates for every participant. The IfW will publish the overall amount of requested certificates on its website, so you can make sure that the certificates have actually been purchased. You will also find a confirmation of the buying process on the website. The corresponding link will be sent to you by email via YouGov. Your personal information will, of course, remain anonymous and will not be published.
